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Abstract 
 
On December 13, 1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
eliminated certain schedules that included repairs and maintenance (R&M) 
disclosures previously required in annual reports and registration statements filed 
with the SEC.  The purpose of this research is to determine if market participants 
utilized R&M information when making investment decisions.  Resulting from a 
variance decomposition approach, the findings indicate that market participants 
did use R&M disclosures in their investment decisions.  Thus, as a possible 
policy implication of this research, the SEC may want to reconsider the decision 
to eliminate the required R&M expenditure disclosures.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Repairs and Maintenance Expenses, SEC, Mandatory Disclosures, 
Value Relevance, Variance Decomposition. 
 
Data Availability:  All data are available from public sources.
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I.  Introduction 
 
 On December 13, 1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issued rulings 33-718, 34-35094, and IC-20766, which eliminated certain 
supplemental financial schedules that all foreign and domestic issuers had to 
include in annual reports and registration statements filed with the SEC.  One of 
the schedules eliminated included repairs and maintenance (R&M) expenditure 
information.  The purpose of the current study is to determine if market 
participants utilize R&M information when assessing the market value of a 
company.  To date, we are aware of no research that documents the use, by 
market participants, of this discontinued R&M information.  This lack of research 
represents a void in the literature that the current study seeks to fill.  If the current 
research shows that market participants utilize R&M information, it could suggest 
that the SEC may want to reconsider the decision to eliminate the R&M 
disclosures.   
Some managers consider R&M expenditures to be semi-discretionary 
expenditures.  For example, Perry and Grinaker (1995) find evidence to suggest 
that managers use R & M expenditures to manage earnings.  More specifically, 
Perry and Grinaker (1995) find that R&M expenditures decrease when earnings 
expectations are not met and R&M expenditures increase when earnings are 
expected to exceed earnings estimates. Therefore, the elimination of R&M 
expenditure information by the SEC could reduce the transparency of financial 
statements and make it easier for management to manage earnings and 
decrease the quality of reported earnings numbers.   
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 To test whether market participants utilized required R&M disclosures, we 
use a variance decomposition approach (VAR) similar to Callen and Segal 
(2004) to assess the contribution of the variance of each independent variable in 
explaining the variance of the dependent variable, without the risk of scale effects 
that occur when measuring the value relevance only with the explanatory power 
of regressions (adjusted R square).  Brown et al. (1999) present evidence that 
scale effects in level regressions increase the adjusted R square, making 
between-sample comparisons problematic.  In this research, we use both VAR 
and Campbell’s (1991) framework.  As a result,  we are able to decompose the 
firm-level stock return into expected return news, operating earnings without 
R&M expenses, R&M expenses, and operating cash flow information, thus 
allowing us to assess the importance of each one of these sources of stock 
return variation for the sample firms.  
 Using both a variance decomposition model as well as a simple 
conditional regression model in which we compare the adjusted R square of 
models with and without the R&M information, we find evidence that R&M 
disclosures are indeed value relevant.  Consistent with our hypothesis, our 
results indicate R&M information explains a portion of the variance of the market 
value of the firm, therefore we can assert that the SEC rulings eliminate 
information that investors use in evaluating and assessing a firm’s future cash 
flows.  In addition, we find that in 1995, the first year after the elimination of R&M 
disclosures, only 14 out of 352 firms (i.e., 4%) in our sample decided to 
voluntarily continue disclosing R&M expenses.  Therefore it appears that, unless 
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firms are required to disclose R&M expenditure information, many firms will 
deprive market participants of information they would use to make their 
investment decisions.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as following.  In the next section, 
we present the motivation for the current study, the formulation of a variance 
decomposition model and the hypothesis.  Section III describes the research 
design.  Section IV explains the data source and the sample selection procedure.  
Section V provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in testing the 
hypothesis and presents empirical results.  Section VI presents the conclusions 
of the study.  
 
II. Background  
 Accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom caused the public to 
demand increased accountability and transparency in financial reporting.  In 
response, Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed into law the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated the creation of 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (O’Sullivan 2007).  The primary 
purpose of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is to 
improve the quality of audits performed by public accounting firms (O’Sullivan 
2007).  Audits provide assurance that publicly traded firms present their financial 
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  
In addition, the SEC relies on the external auditors of publicly traded companies 
to ensure that the financial statements and schedules furnished by those 
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companies in their filings with the SEC contain all the information required by 
SEC regulations.   
 Prior to the issuance of SEC rulings 33-718, 34-35094, and IC-20766, 
publicly traded companies were required to disclose information regarding R&M 
expenses in their filings with the SEC.  During the comment period prior to 
adoption, preparers (e.g., registrants, accounting firms, and related professional 
membership associations) generally supported the elimination of the disclosures 
(SEC 1994).  However, users (e.g., financial analysts) of financial information 
generally were critical of eliminating such disclosures (SEC 1994).  More 
specifically, some financial analysts believed that the cost of providing the 
eliminated disclosures was small and therefore the benefits of disclosure 
exceeded the cost.  Furthermore, they suggested that the elimination of such 
disclosures could result in an increase in the cost of capital due to increased 
investor uncertainty (SEC 1994).  In spite of the comments by some financial 
information users, and in the interest of reducing the costs incurred by 
registrants, the SEC adopted rules that eliminated disclosure of R&M expenditure 
information.  While the SEC considered comments from both preparers and 
users of financial information before deciding to eliminate these disclosures, they 
did not undertake any formal research to determine whether these disclosures 
were used by financial statement readers.  The current study seeks to empirically 
determine if R&M expenditure information is used by market participants when 
making investments decisions.   
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A potential problem with eliminating R&M disclosures is that R&M 
expenditures may be used to manage earnings.  That is, some managers may 
consider R&M expenditures to be semi-discretionary and therefore use R&M 
expenditure decisions as a way to manage earnings.  For example, managers 
can defer R&M expenditures in years when earnings might fall short of 
expectations.  Conversely, management can increase R&M expenditures in 
years when earnings may exceed expectations.  Without requirements to 
disclose R&M expenditures, it is difficult to assess if managers engage in this 
type of earnings management behavior. 
 
Earnings Management: Manipulation of Accruals and Operating Decisions 
Literature related to earnings management is plentiful.  Roychowdhury 
(2004) draws a distinction between two methods of managing earnings: pure 
accrual manipulation and real activities manipulation.  Pure accrual manipulation 
is the use of end of period accruals (e.g., bad debt expense), the delay of writing-
off assets and the selection of particular accounting methods to achieve a 
desired impact on earnings.  Roychowdhury (2004) notes that pure accrual 
manipulations are a convenient way to manage earnings because they (1) have 
no direct cash flow implications, (2) can be done at the end of the period when 
managers are more informed about “pre-managed earnings,” and (3) can be 
done after “earnings targets” are known.  Real activities manipulation is when 
earnings are managed by changes made to operational activities.  Real activities 
manipulation must be done during the year before pre-managed earnings are 
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known and before earnings targets are known.  In a commentary on earnings 
management, Schipper (1989) notes the difficulty of determining the extent of 
earnings management via real activities manipulation.  Real activities 
manipulations that are undertaken to maximize share value are difficult to discern 
from those undertaken to manage earnings (Schipper 1989).   
Several studies examine the use of specific accruals or specific 
accounting methods to manage earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999).  For 
example, Tech, Wong and Rao (1998) find that firms engaged in initial public 
offerings are more likely to use income-increasing depreciation policies and bad 
debt provisions.  Beaver et al. (1989), Moyer (1990), Scholes et al. (1990), 
Wahlen (1994), Beatty et al. (1995), Collins et al. (1995) Beaver and Engel 
(1996), Liu and Ryan (1995) and Liu et al. (1997) all investigate bank loan loss 
provisions.  According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), these studies find evidence 
of earnings management among banks.  Petroni (1992) finds evidence of 
earnings management among insurers via property-casualty insurance claim loss 
reserves.  Together, the foregoing studies provide convincing evidence that pure 
accrual manipulations are used to manage earnings. 
Whereas pure accrual manipulations can be done at the end of the 
accounting period and do not affect cash flows, real activities manipulations must 
be done during the year and typically impact both cash flows and accruals 
(Roychowdhury 2004).  In an investigation of earnings management via real 
activities manipulations, Roychowdhury (2006) concentrates on (1) the 
management of sales via “limited-time” price discounts,, (2) the reduction of 
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discretionary expenses including advertising expenses, research and 
development expenses, and selling and administrative expenses, and (3) the 
overproduction of inventory by manufacturing firms to reduce the cost per unit of 
inventory.  Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence consistent with the supposition 
that managers manipulate sales, discretionary expenses and production levels to 
avoid reporting annual loses.  Roychowdhury (2006) also finds evidence 
(although less robust) that managers manipulate real activities to meet analyst 
forecasts. 
Using R&M expenditures to manage earnings is real operating decision 
and Perry and Grinaker (1995) find evidence that managers make R&M 
decisions in light of earnings expectations.  Perry and Grinaker (1995) manually 
gather R&M expenditure data from Schedule X, Supplemental Income Statement 
Information, Form 10-K filed with the SEC from 196 U.S. firms for the period 
1975-1990.  Using a random walk model applied to reported earnings before 
income taxes and R&M expense, the authors model unexpected earnings and 
use a contingency table to analyze adjustments to R&M in response to positive 
and negative unexpected earnings.  To examine the linear relationship between 
earnings expectations and R&M expenditures, they use Ordinary Least Squares 
regression.   
Consequently, they find that R&M expenditures decrease when earnings 
expectations are not met and R&M expenditures increase when earnings exceed 
earnings estimates, suggesting that managers use R&M expenditures to 
manipulate earnings.  In light of the findings by Perry and Grinaker (1995), the 
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elimination of R&M expenditure information by the SEC may allow managers to 
manipulate earnings more easily via R&M expenditures – resulting in less 
financial reporting transparency. 
 
Earnings Management and Financial Reporting Transparency 
 With demands for more transparency in financial reporting, the SEC’s 
decision to eliminate R&M disclosures is curious.  Do managers adjust their 
earnings management behavior based on the level of financial reporting 
transparency?  Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2006) conduct an experiment to 
determine whether greater transparency in financial reporting reduces the 
likelihood of earnings management.  They ask 62 financial executives and chief 
executive officers to decide which “available-for-sale” securities to sell from a 
portfolio.  The authors utilize a 2 X 2 between subjects design manipulating the 
transparency of comprehensive income reporting and the relationship of 
projected earnings to the consensus forecast.  
Hunton et al. (2006) find that comprehensive income information provided 
in a more transparent format (i.e., separate statement of comprehensive income) 
significantly reduced both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management behavior relative to comprehensive income information provided in 
a less transparent format (i.e., as part of the statement of stockholders’ equity).  
Furthermore, in a debriefing questionnaire, participants indicated that earnings 
management (1) is much more obvious when transparent reporting methods are 
used compared to less transparent reporting methods,  (2) is likely to result in a 
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positive effect on stock price under less transparent reporting conditions and a 
negative effect under more transparent reporting, and (3) will not have an impact 
on reporting reputation under less transparent reporting but will have a negative 
effect under more transparent reporting.   
The results of the Hunton et al. (2006) study suggest that financial 
reporting transparency influences both earnings management behavior and the 
perceived benefits of earnings management.  Their findings further suggest that 
the elimination of R&M type expenditure disclosures will reduce financial 
reporting transparency and possibly result in an increase in earnings 
management via manipulation of R&M expenditures.  Therefore, the elimination 
of R&M disclosures will make it more difficult for users of financial statements to 
assess the level of earnings management and will reduce the quality of reported 
earnings.   
These studies by Roychowdhury (2004 and 2006) and Perry and Grinaker 
(1995) are important because they illustrate that managers can and sometimes 
do manage earnings via operational decisions.  Furthermore, Perry and Grinaker 
(1995) find evidence that managers specifically use R&M expenditures to 
manage earnings.  The research of Hunton et al. (2006) indicates that the level of 
financial reporting transparency impacts both earnings management behavior 
and the perceived benefits of earnings management.  The elimination of R&M 
type expenditure disclosures may enable managers to manage earnings 
because the users of the financial statements will not able to assess the extent to 
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which earnings may have been manipulated by R&M expenditures.  That is, the 
elimination of R&M disclosures makes the financial statements less transparent. 
However, prior research has not determined if investors actually use R&M 
expenditure information when making investment decisions.  This lack of 
research represents a void in the literature that the current study seeks to fill.  If 
investors do not use R&M expenditure information when making investment 
decisions, the elimination of these disclosures should not matter.  However, if 
investors do use R&M expenditure information when making investment 
decisions, prior research suggests that managers will use the non-disclosure of 
R&M information to their advantage and manage earnings via R&M. 
expenditures.  The investing public, unaware of the presence of earnings 
management, may make sub-optimal investment decisions - potentially resulting 
in an inefficient allocation of resources in the capital markets.   
 
 
Earnings Usefulness 
 Similar to Loudder and Behn (1995), to infer earnings usefulness we first 
define a model relating investor valuation to contemporaneous accounting 
information.  Using a Bayesian framework, Lev (1989) demonstrates that the 
correlation between stock price revisions around earnings announcements and 
unexpected reported earnings is inversely related to the perceived deficiencies in 
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reported earnings that are adjusted for market participants.1  The following model 
is adapted from Lev (1989, 187): 
 
( )
( ) )3()( + )ERN(
ERN = 
))ERNE( - ERN()P - P(
)ERNE( - ERN ,P - P cov = r
PD
2
1
2 1/2
1
1101
1101
B
εσσ
σ
σσ
 
 
where 
 
rB   = correlation between unexpected earnings and changes in price; 
P   = price of the firm at time t; 
ERN   = earnings of the firm at time t; 
E   = expectations operator; 
σ2(ERN1)  = variance of "ungarbled" earnings;   
σ2(εPD)  = variance of the adjustments made by investors for the perceived 
deficiencies (PD) in earnings. 
 
 The model demonstrates that if earnings management increases the 
perceived deficiencies in reported earnings, there should be, ceteris paribus, an 
inverse relation between the variance of the adjustments made to accounting 
earnings by investors and the strength of the correlation with stock returns.  
)4(.0 < 
r
2
PD
B
σ∂
∂
 
As the result demonstrates, the correlation between price changes and 
unexpected earnings will be a decreasing function of the amount of accounting 
error induced by methods which recognize accruals in time periods other than 
that in which the expected cash flows occur.  Thus, usefulness is a decreasing 
function of the perceived amount of accounting error in reported earnings.  Since 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to directly measure the market's perception of the 
                                            
1 Lev's model assumes that the market can completely correct for these deficiencies.  If the 
market does not adequately adjust for the error induced by earnings manipulation, the correlation 
between returns and earnings should be even weaker than that forwarded by Lev. 
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accounting error in a firm's reported earnings, the second step in inferring 
usefulness empirically is to derive an appropriate operational proxy for the 
market’s responsiveness to the reported earnings. 
 
 
VAR Formulation  
 To develop an operational definition, we adapt the formulation employed 
by Callen and Segal (2004), which is based on the clean surplus relation from 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995 and 1996). They start with the definition of cum 
dividends equity return: 





 +=
−1
Re
t
tt
t P
DP
t , hence 
log ttRe =log 




 +
−1t
tt
P
DP
or 
=ctr  log 




 +
− 1t
tt
P
DP
 
     = log ( ) ( )1log −−+ ttt PDP  
 
     = ( )( ),exp1log1 tttt pdpp −++− −                                            (1) 
 
where  
 
c
tr
2= log cum dividend stock return at time t, 
=tP market value of equity at time t, 
=tD dividends at time t, 
=tp log market value of equity at time t, 
td = log dividends at time t. 
 
Campbell and Shiller (1988 and 1998) use a Taylor expansion to linearize the 
above equation to generate a log linear valuation equation: 
                                            
2 Lowercase denotes the log of uppercase letters  
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c
tr ( ) 11 −−−++≅ ttt pdph ρρ                                              (2) 
 
where 
 
h is a constant 
ρ is a constant error approximation term. 
 
From here, substituting (2) into (1), replacing the approximation sign with an 
equality, and solving forward for price, we have  
 
( )[ ]∑∞= ++++−+−= oj jtcjtjtt rdE
h
p 1111
ρρ
ρ
                                 (3) 
 
Finally, the substitution of (3) into (2) yields the Campbell (1991) equation for 
unexpected change in current returns: 
( ) ( ) c jt
j
j
tjt
j
j
t
c
tt
c
t rEdErEr +
∞
=
+
∞
=
− ∑∑ ∆−∆∆=−
10
1 ρρ                                                            (4) 
 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
 Adopting the Feltham Ohlson (1995 and 1996) clean surplus relation can 
transform the original Campbell (1991) model to an accounting based model.  
The clean surplus relation is defined as: 
tttt DXBVBV −+= −1 ,  
 
where: 
 
tBV = book value of equity at time t 
tX = net income during time t 
tD =dividends at time t 
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In order to adapt the Callen and Segal (2004) proof of proposition 3 to our 
situation, we change the definition of acct to  
( )





 −+=
−1
1log
t
tt
t OA
COX
acc  .  Thus, our 
representation is defined as  
 
( )[ ]11log −− −−+= tttRMtt OACRMOXacc  
 
where  
1−tOA  = net operating assets at time t-1 
tC   = free cash flow (cash flow from operations less cash investments) during 
time t 
RM
tOX
− = operating earnings plus repairs and maintenance expenses during time 
t 
tRM  = repairs and maintenance expenses during time t. 
 
Hence, the change in expected returns can be expressed as: 
 
rt − Et−1(rt ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑∑
∞
=
+
∞
=
+
∞
=
+
∞
=
+
−
+ ∆−∆−∆−−∆
1000 j
jtt
j
A
jtt
j
jtt
j
jt
RM
jtt rEocfErmEfoxE                  (5) 
 
where 
 
tf   = log risk free rate in period t 
      = log(1 + tF ) 
tF   = the risk-free rate of interest in period t. 
A
jtocf + = tC / 1−tOA  
RM
jtox
−
+  = 
RM
tOX
− / 1−tOA  
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jtrm +  = tRM / 1−tOA  
tr   = the ex dividend log stock return at period t 
= log(1 + tR + tF ) − tf  
tR   = the simple ex dividend excess stock return in period t 
∆ denotes the first difference operator, tE  is the expectations operator, and ∆ tE  
= tE (·)− 1−tE (·). 
 
We can simplify the notation of equation (5): 
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hence 
 
rt − Et−1(rt ) = toxN , - trmN , - tocfN , - trN ,                                   (6)  
 
 
Equation (6) can be used to implement a variance decomposition of the 
unexpected part of the change in market returns.  If we take the variance on both 
sides of the equation, we find: 
 
Var( totalN )=Var( trN , )+Var( toxN , )+Var( trmN , )+Var( tocfN , )-
2Cov( toxN , , trmN , )+2Cov( trmN , , tocfN , )+2Cov( tocfN , , trN , ) –2Cov( trN , , toxN , )           (7) 
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We use equation (7) to assess the relative importance of the different 
components in driving equity returns.  The higher the value of the variance 
(covariance) of each factor on the right hand side of equation (7), the more 
important the factor is in explaining the variance of unexpected returns.  
 
The hypothesis tested (in alternative form) is: 
 
H1: R&M expenditures variance explains the variance of unexpected returns 
(i.e., the R square statistic of a panel regression of returns on accounting 
data (including R&M) is higher than the R square statistic of a similar panel 
regression without R&M data).  
 
III. Research Design 
We adopt a VAR model and Campbell’s (1991) framework to decompose 
the firm-level stock return into expected return news, operating earnings without 
R&M expenses, R&M expenses, and operating cash flow information.  This 
research design allows us to assess the importance of each of those sources of 
stock return variation for the firms in the sample and avoid the problem of classic 
value relevance literature of comparing the adjusted R square value of different 
samples to assess the value relevance of an accounting item.  As Brown et al. 
(1999) show, scale effect problems occur in level regressions, making between-
sample comparisons problematic.  As a sensitivity check, we compare the 
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adjusted R squares of OLS regressions with and without R&M.  Furthermore, we 
compare the adjusted R square of the regression for the sample with R&M 
expenses (1984-1994) with the adjusted R square of the regression including the 
same companies for a longer period (1984-2004) without R&M as an 
independent variable.  
 
IV. Data source and sample selection procedure 
 To perform this analysis, we manually collected R&M data from individual 
firm 10-K reports dated 1984 to 1994.  In addition, we also collected R&M 
information in 1995 to determine how many companies voluntarily disclosed 
R&M information after those disclosures were no longer mandated by the SEC.  
For the other required accounting data (1984-1994) we used the Compustat 
database and for monthly market value information we used the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database (1984-2004).  We have a total of 
6,866 firm-year observations for the period 1984-2004, and 2,653 firm year 
observations for the limited sample including R&M expenditures (1984-1994).  
 Following Callen and Segal (2004), we construct the variables for this 
study using data from Compustat.  Furthermore, financial assets, financial 
liabilities, operating assets, and operating liabilities are computed as in Penman 
(2000). Net interest income and operating income are computed as in Begley 
and Feltham (2002).  More specifically, we use the following data items from 
Compustat to construct the variables used in the analysis: cash and cash 
equivalents (DATA1), current assets (DATA4), current liabilities (DATA5), total 
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assets (DATA6), long-term debt (DATA9), depreciation and amortization 
(DATA14), interest expense (DATA15), income tax expense (DATA16), special 
items (DATA17), income before extraordinary items (DATA18), preferred 
dividends (DATA19), investments and advancements (DATA32), debt in current 
liabilities (DATA34), equity earnings (DATA55), stockholders’ equity (DATA60), 
interest income (DATA62), preferred shares (DATA130), pretax income 
(DATA170), short term investments (DATA193), total liabilities (DATA181), and 
notes payable (DATA206). 
We compute accrual earnings as [(DATA4-lagged DATA4)-(DATA1-
lagged DATA1)] - [(DATA5-lagged DATA5)-(DATA34-lagged DATA34)] -
DATA14.  Cash Earnings as [DATA18 − Accrual Earnings21].  Net Interest 
Income as [(DATA62 − DATA15) * (1 − TAX) − DATA19 + DATA5522].  Net 
Operating Earnings (OXt) as [DATA18 − DATA17 * (1 − TAX) − DATA19 − Net 
Interest Earned].  Financial Assets as [DATA32 + DATA193 + DATA123].  
Financial Liabilities as [DATA9 + DATA34 + DATA130 + DATA20624].  Operating 
Assets as [DATA6 − Financial Assets].  Operating Liabilities as [DATA181 + 
DATA130 − Financial Liabilities].  Net Operating Assets as [Operating Assets − 
Operating Liabilities].  Net Financial Assets as [Financial Assets − Financial 
Liabilities].  Book Value (BVt) as [Net Operating Assets + Net Financial Assets].  
Free Cash Flow as [Net Operating Earnings − Change in Net Operating Assets]. 
Effective Tax Rate (TAX) as [DATA16/DATA170].  Return on Equity (ROE) as  
[(OXt + net interest income)/BV t−1].  The risk-free rate is set equal to the 
annualized three months US Treasury Bill rate. 
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V.  Empirical results 
 
 To estimate the variance decomposition model highlighted above, it is 
necessary to specify the dynamics of the variables included in equation (6). 
Following previous literature (Campbell 1991; Campbell and Ammer 1993; Callen 
and Segal 2004; Vuolteenaho 2002) we adopt a log-linear vector autoregressive 
model (VAR). 
We define tiz , as a vector of firm-specific state variables. This vector is assumed 
to follow a multivariate log-linear dynamic: 
tititi zz ,1,, η+Γ= −  
where: 
Γ , the VAR transition coefficient matrix, is assumed to be constant over time and 
over firms; 
ti,η , the error terms vectors, are assumed to have a variance-covariance matrix 
Σ and to be independent of all known variables at t-1.  
We estimate a VAR model based on one lag each of the mean-adjusted log ex 
dividend annual excess return tr , the mean-adjusted free cash flow 
A
tocf , the 
mean-adjusted log R&M expenses trm , and the mean-adjusted log operating 
earnings plus R&M expenses RMtox
− .  
The VAR model can be described as a system of equations (variables are mean 
adjusted):  
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t
RM
tt
A
ttt oxrmocfrr ,114131211 ηαααα ++++=
−
−−−−  
t
RM
tt
A
ttt
A oxrmocfrocf ,214131211 ηββββ ++++=
−
−−−−  
t
RM
tt
A
ttt oxrmocfrrm ,314131211 ηγγγγ ++++=
−
−−−−  
t
RM
tt
A
ttt
RM oxrmocfrox ,414131211 ηδδδδ ++++=
−
−−−−
−  
Table1 shows the distribution of the variables of interest for the model.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the parameters of the VAR model 
(one lag). The significant (two tails) parameter estimates for the variable 
LNRM_MEAN imply that the past one-year log of the mean of adjusted R&M 
expenses is statistically significant in explaining expected returns, operating 
earnings plus R&M expenses, actual R&M expenses, and actual operating cash 
flow. Expected returns and actual cash operating cash flow are low when past 
R&M expenses are high. Operating earnings plus R&M and actual R&M 
expenses are high when R&M expenses are high.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Relative variance decomposition 
 We can then apply equation (7) to decompose the variance of the 
dependent variable: 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Var ( totalN ) = 0.974+0.087+0.018+0.036-2(0.025) +2(-0.016) +2(0.000)-2(-0.025) 
= 1.116 –0.05-0.032+0.05=1.084 
The variance of the R&M expenses news explains 0.0182/1.084, i.e. 1.7%, 
of the total variance of mean-adjusted returns news. The variance of the 
operating earnings news explains 0.0874/1.084, i.e. 8.0%, of the total variance of 
mean-adjusted returns news. The variance of the free cash flow news explains 
0.0363/1.084, i.e. 3.3%, of the total variance of mean-adjusted returns news. The 
variance of the expected-returns news explains 0.974/1.084, i.e. 89.8%, of the 
total variance of mean-adjusted returns news.  
 
Sensitivity check 
 To make sure the results are not dependent on the VAR model adopted, 
we check our findings running a panel regression for observations between 1984 
and 19943, (the period of time when R&M expense data is available).  
 
The model adopted is:  
itRe =α+β iINCOMBEI* +γ*RM__YW_i+δ*VWRETDi+η*MKTVALUEi+εi,             (a) 
 
We regress returns on income before extraordinary items and tax, R&M 
expenses while controlling for the market returns and the size of the company. 
                                            
3 Qualitative similar results are obtained running OLS regressions. 
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The R square of this model is 0.096 and the coefficient of the R&M variable is 
statistically significant at 5% level. 
[Insert table IV about here] 
We run the same panel regression without the R&M expenses on the whole 
sample (1984-2004), i.e. applying the model: 
 
itRe =α+β iINCOMBEI* +δ*VWRETDi+η*MKTVALUEi+εi,                      (b) 
 
We find a value of the R square equal to 0.043. Finally, we run the same panel 
regression as under model (b) but on the limited sample (1984-1994), excluding 
the R&M expenses: 
 
itRe =α+β iINCOMBEI* +δ*VWRETDi+η*MKTVALUEi+εi,                      (c)  
 
We find a value of the R square equal to 0.093.  There is a significant, although 
small, contribution of the R&M expenses number in explaining the variation of the 
firms’ market returns. The R square of the OLS regression for observations 
between 1984 and 1994 with R&M data is the highest among the three models 
adopted above; i.e. a loss in explanatory power of the independent variables 
occurs in the model when the R&M expenses are not available to investors.  
 
What happened after 1994? 
 
25 
 Since the introduction of the new regulation that eliminated certain 
supplemental financial schedules, firms can voluntarily disclose their R&M costs. 
We analyze 1995’s 10K forms for the 352 randomly drawn firms in our sample.  
Out of 352 firms, only 14 decided to voluntarily disclose this accounting 
information (less than 4%) after the change in the regulation.  Hence, it appears 
that this SEC change in regulation deprived not only in theory but also in practice 
the market participants of a value relevant piece of information that investors 
used  when this disclosure was mandatory.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this research provides evidence that SEC rulings 33-718, 
34-35094, and IC-20766, which eliminated certain required supplemental 
financial schedules that all foreign and domestic issuers had to file with the SEC, 
deprive investors of value relevant information.  More specifically, our results 
provide evidence that that the SEC rulings eliminate information that investors 
use in evaluating and assessing a firm’s future cash flows because R&M 
information explains a portion of the variance of the market value of the firm.  The 
results of this study suggest that R&M disclosures are value relevant, using both 
a variance decomposition model as well as a simple conditional regression 
model.  Moreover, in 1995, the first year that the disclosure of R&M expenditures 
became optional, only 14 out of 352 firms in our sample (4%) decided to 
voluntarily disclose those expenses.  Thus, it appears that most firms will only 
provide R&M expenditure information when it is required by the SEC.  The 
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overall result is that the elimination of R&M expenditure information by the SEC 
will likely reduce the transparency of financial statements, make earnings 
management easier and reduce the quality of reported earnings numbers.  To 
date, no research documents the use of R&M information by market participants.  
The current research, which fills a void in the literature, may lead the SEC to 
reconsider the decision to eliminate the R&M disclosures 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CASH 3665 157.9333 620.8934 0 13790.5 
CA 3513 738.2811 2493.131 .312 41338 
CL 3540 522.1607 1804.711 .164 36737 
TOTASS 3665 2610.718 9931.44 4.224 198598.7 
INCOMEBEI 3663 112.1243 452.0128 -7987 6582 
PREFDIV 3663 2.991069 15.8968 0 356.8 
DEBTINCL 3664 216.6652 2217.953 0 57123.9 
PREFSHARES 3665 26.89495 135.4359 0 2341.7 
PRETAXINC 3663 182.9532 670.8984 -9026 11623 
TOTLIAB 3665 1659.061 7916.401 .164 185324.9 
SHORTINV 3101 62.86788 334.1859 0 8099.875 
SHROUT 3668 49738.96 98523.42 463 1309905 
PRC 3668 26.96342 24.52621 -186.5 283.375 
RET 3655 .0378768 .0948994 -.4565217 .7346939 
RETX 3655 .0358003 .0951082 -.4565217 .7346939 
VWRETD 3668 .0308304 .0327762 -.0263904 .106782 
VWRETX 3668 .028012 .0327228 -.0290602 .1041463 
EWRETD 3668 .0090647 .0219028 -.0346093 .0356767 
EWRETX 3668 .0070209 .0219343 -.0361175 .0338755 
RM__YW_ 2916 93.50668 371.099 .04 5858.2 
FREERATE 3668 6.036115 1.907507 3.02 9.53 
R 3668 -.0274611 .0918975 -.6436838 .4784173 
OX 3663 110.7709 466.0638 -16402.61 6582 
XPLUSRM 2916 204.564 686.6712 -6116 10425.2 
FINASSET 3668 286.0108 958.2721 0 16667.25 
FINLIAB 3668 961.6031 5824.398 0 143743.8 
NETFINASS 3668 -675.5923 5426.703 -139474.4 8202.25 
OPASS 3668 2322.572 9269.704 -37.715 187659.7 
OPLIAB 3668 722.9736 3018.839 -7410 87870 
NETOPASS 3668 1599.598 7153.52 -1906.875 173320.4 
CHANGEOPASS 3315 105.1242 2435.771 -49976.8 117697.9 
C 3315 8.238467 2378.861 -114890.8 47163.54 
OCF 3313 -.0444278 1.474937 -80.57227 4.049078 
RM 2653 .0743654 .2803758 -2.310606 8.993207 
LNRM 2624 -3.047756 .8632997 -6.603963 2.19647 
LNRM_MEAN 2624 1.000248 .2833278 -.720863 2.167366 
OX_RM 2652 .200611 1.41698 -38.78514 51.52731 
LNOX_RM 2544 -1.95681 .855205 -9.929016 3.942112 
LNOX_RM_MEAN 2544 1.000414 .4372214 -2.015395 5.076184 
OXMEAN 2914 1.029937 3.505604 -72.01998 45.74348 
RMMEAN 2916 .9815944 3.895643 .0004199 61.49696 
RM_MEAN 2653 1.00088 3.773564 -31.09833 121.0391 
OX_RMMEAN 2653 .999678 7.062403 -193.3457 256.866 
BOOKVALUE 3668 924.0056 2677.443 -519.733 42832 
 
31 
MKTVALUE 3668 2026.668 5541.537 0 95607.16 
B_M 3662 .632835 .4923182 -3.58078 6.380766 
 
Where: CASH is the value of cash, CA is current assets, CL is current liabilities,  
TOTASS is total assets, INCOMBEI is income before extraordinary items and tax, 
PREFDIV is preferred dividends,  DEBTINCL is debt in Current Liabilities, 
PREFSHARES are preferred shares outstanding, PRETAXINC  is pretax income, 
TOTLIAB is total liabilities, SHORTINV is short term investments, SHROUT is number of 
common shares outstanding, PRC is closing price of common stock, RET is the holding 
period return,  VWRETD is the value-weighted return of the market (included 
distributions), RETX is return without dividends, VWRETX is the value-weighted return of 
the market (excluding dividends),  EWRETD is the equal-weighted return of the market 
(included distribution), EWRETX is the equal-weighted return of the market (excluding 
dividends), RM_YW_ is the value of R&M expenses, FREERATE is the risk free rate of 
return, equal to the annualized three months US Treasury Bill rate, R is the ex dividend 
log stock abnormal return at period t as defined in the paper (log(1 + tR + tF ) − tf ), OX 
is operating earnings, XPLUSRM is operating earnings plus R&M expenses, FINASSET 
is financial assets, FINLIAB is financial liabilities, NETFINASS is net financial assets, 
OPASS is operating assets, OPLIAB is operating liabilities, NETOPASS is net operating 
assets, CHANGEOPASS is change in net operating assets, C is cash flow, OCF is 
operating cash flow, RM is the R&M value divided the net operating assets, LNRM is the 
natural log of RM, LNRM_MEAN is the mean adjusted natural log of RM, OX_RM  is the 
operating earnings plus R&M expenses divided the net operating assets, LNOX_RM is 
the natural log of OX_RM, LNOX_RM_MEAN is the mean adjusted natural log of 
OX_RM, BOOKVALUE is the sum of net operating assets and net financial assets,  
MKTVALUE is the value of the firm on the market (number of shares outstanding times 
closing price PRC), B_M is book to market ratio (BOOKVALUE/MKTVALUE)  
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Table 2 Vector Autoregression for lags 1-1 
Sample: 1986 to 1994 
 
Equation T k RMSE "R-sq" F P 
R_MEAN 2132 4 .9879082 0.0304 30850.35 0.0000 
LNOX_RM_MEAN 2132 4 .2959858 0.9254 6599.767 0.0000 
LNRM_MEAN 2132 4 .1351013 0.9830 1.970008 0.0965 
OCF_MEAN 2132 4 .190727 0.0037 16.66349 0.0000 
 
R_MEAN Coef.. Std. Err t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
R_MEAN L1  .0222597 .0212563  1.05 0.295 -.0194257 .0639451 
LNOX_RM_MEAN 
L1 
-.0302418 .0656729 -0.46 0.645 -.1590317 .0985481 
LNRM_MEAN L1 -.1330399 .0684018 -1.94 0.052 -.2671814 .0011016 
OCF_MEAN L1 -.0387822 .0990704 -0.39 0.695 -.233067 .1555026 
 
LNOX_RM_MEAN Coef.. Std. Err t P>t [95% Conf. Inter val] 
R_MEAN L1 -.0229144 .0063686 -3.60 0.000 -.0354037 -.0104251 
LNOX_RM_MEAN 
L1 
.5975136 .0196762 30.37 0.000 .558927 .6361001 
LNRM_MEAN L1 .3883395 .0204938 18.95 0.000 .3481495 .4285294 
OCF_MEAN L1 .0252925 .0296823 0.85 0.394 -.032917 .0835019 
 
LNRM_MEAN Coef.. Std. Err t P>t [95% Conf. Interval ] 
R_MEAN L1 -.0014188 .0029069 -0.49 0.626 -.0071195 .0042819 
LNOX_RM_MEAN 
L1 
-.0566533 .0089811 -6.31 0.000 -.074266 -.0390407 
LNRM_MEAN L1 1.054423 .0093543 112.72 0.000 1.036079 1.072768 
OCF_MEAN L1 .0790775 .0135484 5.84 0.000 .0525081 .1056469 
 
OCF_MEAN Coef.. Std. Err t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]  
R_MEAN L1 -.0038717 .0041038 -0.94 0.346 -.0119195 .0041762 
LNOX_RM_MEAN 
L1 
.023786 .0126789 1.88 0.061 -.0010783 .0486504 
LNRM_MEAN L1 -.031117 .0132058 -2.36 0.019 -.0570145 -.0052194 
OCF_MEAN L1 -.0098359 .0191267 -0.51 0.607 -.0473448 .027673 
 
Where: R_MEAN is the mean adjusted value of the abnormal return of the share of the 
company at time t, LNOX_RM_MEAN is the mean adjusted natural log of operating 
earnings plus R&M expenses,  LNRM_MEAN is the mean adjusted natural log of R&M 
expenses, and OCF_MEAN is the mean adjusted value of operating cash flow.   
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Table 3 Covariance Matrix of Residuals 
 
 R_MEAN LNOX_RM_MEAN LNRM_MEAN OCF_MEAN 
R_MEAN .97413147      
LNOX_RM_MEAN -.02527207 .08744325     
LNRM_MEAN -.00584405 .02538268 .01821811   
OCF_MEAN .00062989 -.03068673 -.01618985 .03630855 
 
Where: R_MEAN is the mean adjusted value of the abnormal return of the share of the 
company at time t, LNOX_RM_MEAN is the mean adjusted natural log of operating 
earnings plus R&M expenses,  LNRM_MEAN is the mean adjusted natural log of R&M 
expenses, and OCF_MEAN is the mean adjusted value of operating cash flow.   
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Table 4 Panel Regression Models 
 
Model a (sample 1984 – 1994): 
itRe =α+β iINCOMBEI* +γ*RM__YW_i+δ*VWRETDi+η*MKTVALUEi+εi, 
Model b (sample 1984 – 2004) :  
itRe =α+β iINCOMBEI* +                         δ*VWRETDi+η*MKTVALUEi+εi, 
Model c (sample 1984 – 1994):  
itRe =α+β iINCOMBEI* +                          δ*VWRETDi+η*MKTVALUEi+εi 
 
Variable Model a Model b Model c 
INCOMEBEI 9.698e-06** 3.118e-06 .0000108**    
RM__YW_ -.00001385**   
VWRETD .84780276*** .59585418*** .8458042***   
MKTVALUE -1.939e-07 -3.195e-07** -9.03e-07**      
R-square overall 0.0956 0.0433 0.0934 
N of obs 2908  6825 2908  
legend: * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
where: INCOMBEI is income before extraordinary items and tax, RM_YW_ is the value 
of R&M expenses, VWRETD is the value weighted market returns with dividends, and 
MKTVALUE is the value of the firm on the market.  
 
